SSJ 100 descent: Innocent but deadly - Part 1

Note: 

Updated info received and is included in Part 2: SSJ 100 descent: Innocent but deadly - Part 2, 
and article on my view of the crash site is at: SSJ 100 crash site: The worst place in the whole mountain.

It is a question that has been bugging me, and probably a lot of other people too.

Why did he descend? Why did the ATC authorize the request to descend?

I am not into the blaming game, but I want my questions answered. The official answer, will have to come from the official investigators. In the meantime, I can't stop my mind from exploring plausible theories.

If we recall that chart I posted on the day of the accident at my first blog article on the accident:

Halim AFC chart by Lido (Lufthansa)

We can see that it is obvious that there are terrain just south of the 25 nautical mile MSA (Minimum Sector Altitude) circle. The MSA for the south is 6,900ft. The MORA (Minimum Off Route Altitude) for the Mt. Salak area is 11,900ft, thanks to the higher and bigger Mt. Pangrango just to the east.

IFR vs VFR... Instrument vs Visual Flight Rules

Question: If it's an IFR flight, MSA 6,900ft? MORA 11,900ft? Why descend?

The next question I asked: "Was this an IFR flight or a VFR flight?" Wait, it could be a VFR flight. If it is a VFR flight, he should have done all he needed to remain in 5 kilometers of visibility, and stay away from the clouds and terrain. But, did he lose Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)?

If one loses VMC on a VFR flight, one is in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Best thing to do, bug out! If unsure, make a 180 turn and come back to where you were before, it might as well be the fastest way to return to VMC. Ducking under the cloud, is an option, but only if you know what's down there, otherwise, you'd be asking for trouble. The question then becomes, "did he know there was a mountain down there?"

If I stay on this, I'd be running around in circles. Then I asked...

Where did they go on the previous flight?

I discussed this with my friend and fellow AvGeek, Andy D (@infohots) who went on the first demo flight that day. He said he couldn't see much because he sat on the aisle seat, but the flight was short, and no "funny maneuvers" were made (which is alleged by some media). That flight took off and landed on runway 24 at Halim Airport.

He managed to take a photo of the flight deck before landing at Halim Airport. 

SSJ100 co-pilot displays on first demo flight
as the aircraft nears Halim Airport

We can see that the aircraft was on a heading of 029°, doing 238 knots indicated air speed, passing 7200ft, 10 nautical miles from Halim airport roughly at a bearing of 150°. The next waypoint programmed in the aircraft FMC (Flight Management Computer) is AL01, a pseudo-waypoint (AL 150°/3nm approx) at 10.1 nautical miles away, used to allow for a nice turn onto the ILS 24 at AL NDB. We can also see that the aircraft is on Heading Select, Speed Select, and Vertical Speed Select modes (029°, 230 knots, -1300 feet per minute), with Altitude Select at 6000 feet. Winds indicated on the top left of the Navigation Display shows 150° at 8 knots, a ground speed of 274 knots, and true airspeed of 270 knots. The orange box surrounding the "SPEED" on the Flight Mode Announciator, hints that the aircraft is faster than the selected speed, but the autothrust has already commanded idle thrust.

The green line shows the FMC flight path, and we can see that the aircraft has been flying straight for over 10 nautical miles when the photo was taken. There is also a dotted cyan coloured line extending from Halim Airport to the bottom of the screen. Taking measurements of these lines, it can be estimated that the cyan line roughly follows a line extending out of Halim VOR (HLM) at a course of roughly 200°. Coincidentally, airway R206 extends from Halim VOR at a course of 195° with a MEA (minimum enroute altitude) of 10,000 south of Halim).

Initial Testing of a Theory

Where do the green and cyan lines intersect? Let us go for a convenient location, 30 nautical miles out from Halim along airway R206.

We can program the Flight Management Computer this way:
1. Depart Runway 24
2. Proceed to HLM195/30 (radial 195° at 30 nautical miles from Halim VOR)
3. Proceed to AL150/3 (radial 150° at 3 nautical miles from AL non-directional beacon)
4. Proceed to AL NDB
5. Proceed with ILS approach runway 24.
6. Set the cruise altitude at 10,000ft
Total distance would be about 80 to 85 nautical miles.

Initial theory of the 1st flight based on the photograph
Cyan: Planned, Green: Descriptive Flight Path

To go back to Halim, for an ILS24 (instrument landing system approach for runway 24), they would simply turn left towards AL01. Ideal! They stayed at the MEA, above any immediate terrain risk. Top of Descent would  be after the turn was completed, and after they were well away from terrain. Simple rule-of-thumb of jet flying of "3 Nautical Miles per 1000ft" on descent concurs with this, and they were quite close to Halim Airport when still at 7200ft. 

Runway Change for Second Demo Flight

Andy, told me that he heard the discussions that the next flight would be required to be done to/from Runway 06. The reason for this is, as he recalls, is to keep the aircraft away from conflict from traffic to/from the main international airport, Soekarno Hatta (CGK/WIII) to the north east as they expect the runway in use to be 07L/R. The change to runway 06 for Halim would ensure that traffic inbound to Halim Airport would stay away from the departure flows from CGK, and below the incoming flow to CGK.

The above, is important for the ATC (Air Traffic Control) at Jakarta, which literally swamped with traffic on a daily basis at peak hours. The second demo flight would take at the beginning of "Golden Hour", a term several colleagues use to describe the afternoon peak traffic flow periods at CGK.

So, with a simple runway change to 06, the waypoints would now be:
1. Depart Halim runway 06
2. Proceed to HLM195/30 (radial 195° at 30 nautical miles from Halim VOR)
3. Proceed to HLM250/5 (radial 250° at 5 nautical miles from Halim VOR, this is the straight in portion for the Halim VOR approach for runway 06 as there is no ILS for runway 06)
4. Land at Halim runway 06.
5. Set the cruise altitude at 10,000ft
Total distance would be about 55 to 60 nautical miles.

With the cruise altitude set to 10,000ft like the previous flight to stay clear of any terrain.

Suspected planned flight path for second demo flight.
Cyan: Waypoint-to-waypoint. Green: Descriptive estimate.

Effects of Runway Change and FMC default waypoint Fly-By turn method

The plan for the second flight, would be much shorter, at 57 nautical miles. From after completing the turn near the mountains, the distance to go to land would roughly be less than 30 nautical miles. Counting the effects of the "fly-by" method of FMC navigation for turns, there will always be a short cut made due to the arc in the turn. 

Unless a particular waypoint is set as "Fly-Over", the default FMC turn method for the waypoint would be "Fly-By" where it would turn inside the straight lines into and out of the waypoint, using standard turn rates, to prevent overshooting the next planned course line to the next waypoint. This is why for both flights, I use the cyan colour for the FMC plan, and the green colour for the estimated actual flight path or flight path anticipated by the FMC. There are however, limitations to how much the FMC would shortcut in sharp turns. Depending on the speed, very sharp turns will remain at standard turn rates, but the flight path stays no further than a set radius from the waypoint, and allow some overshooting of the next segment course. This is to prevent wide deviations from airways when there are sharp turns, reducing navigational accuracy.

The FMC does this because it is designed to optimize the flight in terms of distance, time, and cost. Fly-by reduces the distance, fly-over increases the distance travelled. The problem is that for fly-by turn method, the flight paths of the turn aren't always repeatable, depending on the conditions at the time (wind, speed, etc). So the green line in the charts are only descriptive.

With the paths of these demo flights, the shortcuts generated by the FMC can be quite big as a percentage of the total distance travelled. This brings the Top of Descent  much earlier.

Calculating your descent

Given the FMC waypoint fly-by default method, the top of descent from 10,000 feet for the second flight would likely be before the turn back to Halim. The descent request could have ben made within the Bogor Training Area.

The turn back to Halim is almost a 180° turn. If the turn was commenced at 25 nautical miles away from HLM, the turn would be completed with the same distance from Halim. That would also allow the aircraft to come reasonably close to the waypoint at 30 nautical miles during the turn. From there, the aircraft has about 20 nautical miles to go to the final approach, which require extra distance to slow down and allow the aircraft to configure for the final approach. This slowing down can take between 3 to 5 nautical miles in level flight. The mental calculation that would go on in the pilot's head could be something like:

• 5 nautical miles for slowing down to final approach therefore 
• 15 nautical miles to descend after completing the turn.
• 15 nautical miles means I can lose 5000ft.
• To be at 1500 feet in 15 nautical miles, I need to be at about 6000 feet or lower leaving the turn.
• To lose 4000 feet, I'm going to need about 12 nautical miles.
• At 300 knots true airspeed, the 180° turn will take about 8 nautical miles, losing 2000ft to 2500ft or so.
• That means I need to start my descent before I reach 4 nautical miles before commencing the turn, therefore start the descent about 21 nautical miles from Halim, before the turn back to Halim.
• To give a few miles spare distance, I can start descending perhaps at around 17 nautical miles from Halim or so.

Guess what, 17 nautical miles is within Bogor Training Area, and nearer to the northern edge of the area. The explanation by the ATC that they allowed the aircraft to descend to 6000ft because the aircraft was at Bogor Training Area, is very logical, and without abusing our 20/20 hindsight, perfectly innocent.

From the Lido chart, we can see the deadly implication of this. The aircraft impacted terrain at around 6200ft elevation at a position of around 27 to 28 nautical miles from Halim. To lose 3800ft, one needs about 11 to 12 nautical miles. This could mean he descended at around DME15. The 2 nautical miles, may sound a lot, but, that's about 24 seconds only at 300 knots.

But surely he must have known he was heading towards a mountain???

Yes, sure, thanks to our 20/20 hindsight, it's simple to jump to that conclusion. Let's throw out our 20/20 hindsight.

First question, did he see the mountain?

Weather data gathered by LAPAN's Atmospheric and Science Center

A Kompas newspaper article came out on 11th May, citing the Atmosphere and Science Center of LAPAN, Indonesia's national space and aviation agency, stated that the aircraft was likely to have been surrounded by weather. There were cumulonimbus clouds in the area, and the weather satellite image below, shows the situation near the time of the accident. Mt. Salak, was very likely to have been obscured by cloud.

Second question, did he know the mountain was there?

We have the luxury in this article with the chart that has terrain information. It is reported that the crew did receive a local area briefing for Bogor Training Area, which describes the area, including the surrounding terrain, and should have included information on Mt. Salak. The charts showing the terrain would likely be Visual Flying Rules (VFR) charts, which does not include airway information, but a lot of other information for VFR flying. Yes, the pilot had to sign off that he received the briefing. However, he planned to fly at 10,000ft. Mt. Salak is only 7200ft. Attention would probably be given to the nearby and much bigger Mt. Pangrango.

Halim AFC chart by Lido (Lufthansa)

If we look at the Lido chart above, we can see the MORA (Minimum Off Route Altitude) is 11,900ft. This is to give adequate clearance from Mt. Pangrango at 9,900ft, not Mt. Salak.

Furthermore, the charts the crew used, are Jeppesen charts. They would not be using any Standard Instrument Departures (SIDs) or Standard Arrivals (STARs), since they're not going to another city, they would not be looking at the en-route chart except maybe for checking the MORA. The approach chart for Halim, has terrain information MSA of 6,900ft south of HLM VOR, but nothing else, and the mountains are outside the MSA circle and not covered by the approach charts.

The pictures uploaded by Andy D (shown in part 2), only showed that the crew had the approach and ground charts when he took photographs of the cockpit. No enroute charts, no VFR charts (and these are quite sizeable even when folded), but since he was flying IFR, why would he need the VFR charts? So, it is unlikely that they had the charts showing where Mt. Salak was.

Third question, couldn't they see Mt. Salak on the flights? Surely they should have seen the 7200ft mountain on a 10,000cruise altitude?

Well, not really. If we look at this video:

Video by Fotografersha/Lystseva Marina/@lystseva

We can see at 3:39, to 3:50 the general visibility condition for the first flight. Less than 10 kilometers. On the take-off cabin view shown at 5:10 to 5:30, the visibility is about 7 kilometers (this didn't get any better at Halim for the final take off shown at 7:38, and at the beginning of the video).

On the first flight, the flight distance to D30 is closer than the second flight. They would be close to D30 at top of climb. This leaves a very narrow time window for Mt. Salak to appear and be seen in front of them. During the climb, their view of Mt. Salak would have been relatively obstructed by the aircraft's nose attitude, therefore wouldn't raise attention. If it was obstructed by cloud, they would have completely forgotten about it because attention would be given to Mt. Pangrango instead. This is the dominating mountain for the Jakarta area, it rises to 9,900ft, and very visible during the left turn back to Halim for the first flight.

This would latch on to the mental picture for the second flight. If they lose visibility, they would surely want to stay away from Mt. Pangrango. Mt. Salak, was innocently forgotten.

Looking out for Mt. Salak - Flight Simulator fans as guinea pigs

I tested several flight simulator friends, inviting them to "reconstruct the SSJ100 crash." The ones selected had to have the real terrain mesh, conduct the flight and debriefing was made on each flight. The flights were:

• SimFlight 1: Depart runway 24 Halim, proceed to 45 nautical miles on a radial of 195° from Halim, and turn back to land runway 24. Cruise altitude would be 15,000 feet.
• SimFlight 2: The same as SimFlight1, but use runway 06.
• SimFlight 3:  Depart runway 24 Halim, proceed to 30 nautical miles on a radial of 195° from Halim, and turn back to land runway 24. Cruise altitude would be 10,000 feet.
• SimFlight 4: Same as SimFlight 3, but use runway 06.

On all flights, weather was set to clear skies, to exaggerate the mental picture on what they see and suppress mental clutter.

Each debriefing started with them asking me back, "What's the point of this?" They thought we were going to simulate the crash, not the factors surrounding it. What was found:

• Everyone commented that during climb, the mountain they can see would be Mt. Pangrango and not Mt. Salak.
• Everyone commented that during cruise, attention would be given to Mt. Pangrango because the peak elevation isn't far from the planned cruise altitude.
• Everyone raised attention to Mt. Pangrango when and after making the left turn to turn back to Halim (before the descent and approach runway 24).
• None mentioned their awareness of Mt. Salak. When questioned, no one can describe the position of Mt. Salak in comparison to their position.

I asked several pilots who fly in and out of Jakarta's CGK, where the SID to the east would take them over HLM VOR. All knew that the were 2 mountains south of Jakarta, but as expected, none could recall the rough distances from HLM to the terrain. Even those who had trained in the Bogor Training Area, cannot recall the distance from area to Mt. Salak. They just took the assumptive prevention of "let's not go south of the training area." The pilots, generally agree with my findings on pilot perception from the flight sim tests.

Conclusion for Part 1:
This blog article does not attempt to explain or speculate on how the crash happened, but only to seek a logical explanation on why the request for descent was made and the clearance to descent was given. It is extremely unlikely that they saw Mt. Salak when they made the request for descent. It is quite unlikely that their main concern about terrain was Mt. Salak, worrying about keeping separation from Mt. Pangrango would be sensible.

It is ironic that a simple runway change would cause such a dramatic change in situation, risk, etc. But it happened, and happened innocently. If this explanation is logical, we should therefore dismiss:

• Allegations of pilot bravado, and carelessness
• Allegations of ATC carelessness and cover-ups (and hey, the ATC had other aircraft to monitor too, not just this aircraft!)

The final descent for RA-97004 is seemingly innocent, but deadly.

This is only "Objective Speculation," using publicly available data and information. It is aimed at answering/countering the reckless speculation and allegations that are out there. For official stuff, well, go and look for the official press releases, and when it comes out, the final report.

In Part 2, I will discuss the updated version of the speculation provided in this article, using updated information that were made available to the public from various sources.

Note: 
Updated info received and is included in Part 2: SSJ 100 descent: Innocent but deadly - Part 2, 
and article on my view of the crash site is at: SSJ 100 crash site: The worst place in the whole mountain.

SSJ 100 Accident Day 4 Reflections: The Media!

Appearing again on Berita Satu earlier today.
Some media however, prefer to choose "instant experts"
or just plain unconsulted ridicuous stuff!

Saturday was a relatively media-free day. I had some much needed rest and had a weekend work meeting that I had to leave behind slightly due to interview requests.

I complain yet again, it has been a very tiring few days. Apart from work stuff, I had to do some analysis on the accident to look at the question: "Why did he descend?" and "Why did the ATC allowed him to descend?" However, I'll cover the details on this in another blog entry.

I must apologize to 1TV Russia for a very late reply to them on interview request because I had to do the analysis I feel I needed to do.

Today, I find it interesting that BeritaSatu TV called me up again to talk about the SSJ 100 (and a little bit about the accident).

When I told my wife last night of the requests (and she had to put up with me answering media calls over the past few days even at home), she asked, "Has the world really ran out of industry observers to talk to about this?"

Before I could answer, she looked back at the TV screen, when an "instant expert" was talking rubbish on TV. She immediately said, "Oh, well, nevermind..."

The accident has raised an interesting questions amongst local avgeeks (also known as aviation enthusiasts), and my friend who jointly takes care of the @indoflyer twitter account, tweeted:

#indoflyer #sharing, seberapa objektifkah media massa dalam meliput kecelakaan penerbangan? Share your thought with #indoflyer hastag.

Basically meaning, "How objective is mass media on covering air accidents?"

It got me to tweet the following in Indonesian:

@indoflyer #indoflyer objektifitasnya terganggu karena ber-tahun2 pembodohan masyarakat mengenai kecelakaan penerbangan.

Objectivity has been affected by years of the public being duped in statements (official and unofficial) on air accidents.

Yes, we had some of the most ridiculous statements being made up to 5 years ago when the FAA decided to put us as Country Category II and the EUETC decided to place a ban on Indonesian airlines.

I went on.

#indoflyer: Gangguan terbesar dlm mslh berita kecelakaan pesawat: masih banyak kutu busuk yg seneng menyesatkan org dgn berita2 palsu!

The biggest problem is the amount of scumbags that get kicks by duping people with fake news.

Fake news in air accidents is nothing new. Remember the Adam Air 574 crash? Someone leaked fake news to the media and several government agencies, that survivors from the aircraft were found somewhere up in hills, and it turned out that they were survivors from a ferry sinking (how a ferry sinking survivor ends up in the mountains, I don't know!). On this one, we had news that cellphones were contactable, or that the aircraft was found here and there. I even heard one that claimed the plane and survivors were on Mt. Pangrango and accused the SAR teams of murder for refusing to go up Mt. Pangrango!

And then there are photos being circulated of "the crash site", only to show the wing from the Air Blue A321 that crashed near Islamabad a while back. Just now, I found out about pictures of the dead victims being circulated, only to be determined to be a hoax. The origin was a Twitter account that has now been suspended, and that the police are looking into bringing criminal charges to the person starting it all up.

But Indonesian media, has another problem:

#indoflyer: Kurangnya praktisi/pengamat independen yg mengerti penerbangan = kebutuhan informasi dr sumber independen tdk dpt dipenuhi!

The lack of independent observers/practicioners that adequately understand aviation means the (public's) need for information from independent sources cannot be fulfilled.

#indoflyer: utk kecelakaan, kalangan profesi maskapai, operator dan regulator harus menjaga kode etik mengenai info kecelakaan penerbangan.

When talking about accidents, professionals from the airlines, operators (such as airports and ATC) and regulators, must abide by a certain code of ethical conducts when talking about air accidents.

#indoflyer: kode etik & peraturan tempat kerja= membatasi info yg bs disampaikan ke media masa & masyarakat. Sumber independen dibutuhkan!

The code of ethic and workplace rules, limit the information that can be conveyed to the public and mass media. Independent sources are needed!

#indoflyer: krn itu, setiap ada kecelakaan, media kekurangan sumber opini independen yg credible! Hasilnya, "pakar instan" yg pada nongol!

As a result, whenever there is an accident, the media lacks sources of independent and credible opinions. The result is, "instant experts" immediately appear (to which we all hate with a passion)!!!

Then someone tweeted:

@(identity protected) Tunggu investigasi bagusnya pak, cuma black box jangan keluar lah, di indo aja biar jelas

Sir,don't you think it is better to wait for the investigation, but the blackboxes should remain in Indonesia to keep the investigation objective

To which I responded:

#indoflyer menunggu hsl resmi itu baik, tp tdk menjwb kebutuh masyarakat yg ingin tahu & khawatir. Ttpi, spekulasi ngawur jg sgt tdk baik!

Waiting for the investigation is good, but does not answer the public's curiousity and worries/fears. But, ridiculous speculation is also very counter productive.

To which I gave my own case:

#indoflyer: sy ingin tahu knp teman saya meninggal di pesawat tsb tanpa hrs nunggu 1thn, ttp saya tdk ingin diberikan penjelasan asbun!

I want to know why my friend died in that aircraft without having to wait for a year for the answer, but I don't want to be given a stupid answer!

I am sure that MANY would agree with me on this point. Friends and relatives of the dead, do not need a complete answer quickly, but they need some credible answer to their question, relatively quickly. This doesn't mean that they should receive stupid explanation. 

The lack of understanding by some in the media with regards to aviation, is worrying. One of the  most ridiculous debacle was when an Adam Air 737 made a heavy landing in Surabaya and bent its fuselage. Media initially reported correctly that an aircraft made a heavy landing and aircraft damaged (some mentioned it as a minor crash, which is not incorrect either!). But then the airline denied it, even when shown pictures of a 737-300 with a broken back. "It's just bent, it's not damaged." The sad summary is, some bought that story! But then, even when it comes to good news, the local media, believes anything the airline churns out.

Is there hope still? I think so! But when I read an article saying "the airplane crashed because they ran out of fuel" when they quoted the Director General of Civil Aviation, who explained that the aircraft was declared missing and likely to have crashed, when the aircraft was still not found after the aircraft's endurance time had lapsed, and the article concluded, "therefore the aircraft crashed because they ran out of fuel", I feel like the war is lost.

Despite my complaints and whinings in this article, I must remain thankful that I am friends with some of the best (in my opinion) aviation journalist and social media persons in the world, and that sensible mass media still call up for my opinion and insight. No, the war isn't lost yet!

SSJ 100 Accident Day 3 Reflections: Recovery under way

It has been a very busy few days. I feel like  fugitive sometimes, the media is hunting me down. I must select between the ones I am comfortable talking to with, and the ones that I'm not comfortable with. Why? This thing is pretty tiring on me too!

It seems that the whole world is beginning to look for quick answers. Unfortunately, there are none!

Recovery Operations are finally in full swing on Saturday, my friend and colleague, Roland, who also lost 2 of his friends on board, has been in Halim every day since the accident. He took the following photos yesterday:

The media, covering the arrivals of the body bags.

Indonesian Red Cross Helicopter

Transfer

Nasional Search And Rescue Agency BO-105

Colibris

The Russians have arrived... Again
Il-76(s) carrying helicopter(s) to assist in recovery efforts

Police N-Bell 412

More and more body parts in body bags are being airlifted back to Halim Airport, for identification at the nearby National Police Hospital. I expect that Sunday, will bring good weather, so a lot more can be done as well!

Most of my friends who knew someone onboard, are beginning to settle down now, accepting the inevitable. Prayers for the departed...

All photos above by Roland Adrie

Superjet accident south of Jakarta: My notes and comments Part 2

This article is Part 2. Part 1 is here
Last Updated 2012-05-12 0600UTC
Most Recent Update at bottom of article.

The developments surrounding the accident is quite overwheming on Thursday, and to a certain extent, also today. So much has happened and is happening, that it is difficult to know where to start the next update/article.

I have decided to separate subsequent articles on the accident into several categories. I don't know how many will be made, but it is impossible to keep all the developments and my notes, in one place. However this will take time, as I am trying to catch some much needed rest.


Personal Note Edit (2012-05 1830UTC):
Several media (in Indonesia, and outside) have quoted me as a pilot. Let me clarify: I AM NOT A PILOT! And I never claim to the media that I am one. I flew over the Mt. Salak - Mt. Pangrango area 9 years ago for several months as part of a crew of a remote sensing mission on a light aircraft, before we were deployed to another part of the country. I was not flying the aircraft as a pilot, but was part of an operating crew, in charge of the overall mission. That includes making observations and monitoring the flight for safety hazards, and the performance of the mission. The media may have quoted me as a pilot for simplicity reasons to explain what I did. Part of an operating crew, yes. A pilot, No!


Summary since the last update at 10th May 2012 at 0412 UTC:

• Aircraft has been found. The location appears to show the aircraft had hit a near vertical wall on the mountain.
• The likelihood of finding any survivors are next to zero, but we are all still hoping for a miracle.
• Ground rescue crews have now managed to reach the crash site. The photo shows that it is extremely difficult to get there.
• 12 bodies have been recovered, and are to be transported to the nearest staging post, then airlifted to Halim Air Force base, then to the Police Hospital for victim identification.
• More developments surrounding the circumstances of the day. Weather information data now suggest that the flight was surrounded by bad weather shortly before the descent and turn. However, this information released by LAPAN, will be further analyzed.

Update 2012-05-11 1630UTC:
SAR crews report 20 bodies have been recovered, for transfer to Halim Airport in the morning.


Update 2012-05-11 2050UTC:

French accident investigators are being sent to Jakarta to assist with the Russian and Indonesian accident investigators. (Need Confirmation)


Update 2012-05-11 2140UTC:

ATC now confirms that the aircraft was cleared to descend to 6000ft. According to ATC, the request was made over the Bogor Training Area, which is clear of terrain, and that the aircraft requested to make a right hand orbit. Bogor training area (WI-R4 Atang Sanjaya Training Area) is 5-12 miles north of Mt. Salak, and terrain is no higher than 3000ft. ATC also confirmed that the crew had been briefed on the training area and reviewed the necessary aeronautical information publication and had signed it off in order to obtain be able to use the area. (source: Kompas.com)


Update 2012-05-12 0340UTC:

Army: Yesterday 12 bags of human remains, not bodies, were received. Recovery operations for today focus on finding more human remains, and the black-boxes. Aircraft parts recovery are done only for aircraft parts which cannot be separated from human remains. Yesterday's recovery operations hampered by weather which closed in by 10am. "Today's condition is much  better", according to Major General Sonny Widjaja Army Siliwangi Division in a field interview by MetroTV. "We want to get as many bags they can fill, to Halim Airport." I agree. The sooner, the better.



Update 2012-05-12 0600UTC:

First bags containing human remains from the Sukhoi Superjet accident has arrived at Halim Airport at around 1200 local time. The remains were transferred to a nearby police hospital to commence the identification process.

Superjet disappears south of Jakarta: My notes and comments

This article is Part 1. Part 2 can be found HERE.


UPDATES ARE SEQUENCED DOWNWARDS.
Latest Update: 2012-05-10 1120UTC.


It is not a good day. Sukhoi Superjet RA97004 disappeared south of Jakarta this afternoon. At the time this article is first published on this blog, it is not yet found. Several friends almost went on the flight, some went to the earlier flight, some cancelled. Lucky I was not invited because otherwise I would have gone on it. Unfortunately, a friend is on that flight, and some others I know was onboard too.

Earlier, I made the following tweets:

• "SSJ100 crash site reported found by SAR heli just prior to aborting due to bad weather. No info on survivors. Awaiting official word."
• "If SSJ crash site is as predicted, it lies JUST outside the MSA 6900 (HLP) or 6000 (AL). 7900ft peak just outside the MSA circle. MORA 11900"

The first one was received from someone at the crisis center at Halim. It has not been confirmed by the official press release. Further investigation into that lead turned up as the SAR heli pilot thought he saw something but cannot investigate closer due to the need to abort due to bad weather. The air search is abandoned for the day/night. Ground search party has been dispatched involving 30 teams of 20 people each. Mt. Salak is very well trekked by rescuers etc. BUT, it is also a tricky place to navigate overland. Even experienced team with GPS get lost during the day. So expect the night ground search to be painstakingly slow despite their best efforts. The last thing we want is "search the rescuers."

There are questions, one of them:

• "Mount Salak is over 7000 feet high, and they were given permission to descend to 6000 feet?"

There are no information that the ATC granted the request. The aircraft would be handled by Jakarta Approach South/East or Jakarta South Sector (if they planned to go south of the mountain range). Given the time of day, I suspect whichever ATC was handling the flight, are swamped with 07L/R departures to south east from CGK or handling sequencing for 25L arrivals, as well as low level traffic inbound to Halim airport. 1 lone flight to the south under radar control, would be the highest priority. Their request, might require several calls. It's possible that the crew took their own action.

And another question in Airliners.net forum topic on this accident:

For folks like me unfamiliar with Indonesia locations and such - the 'crash' site is apparently about 30-35 nm almost due south of the Jakarta airport... The plane was 30-35 miles from landing - so descending in that manner would be normal. However if the plane was a few miles south of where the pilots thought the plane was located - it could have descended too quickly.

I've flown around that area a lot in the past. It's nice and scenic in VMC. But between Mt. Salak and Mt. Pangrango, one has to have their wits around and not have a lapse of situational awareness. Some very strange winds are up there, and conditions are unpredictable even in VMC, and in IMC, it's damn awful. I must thank my fortunes to not have to go through the pass between those two mountains anymore these days!

Taken from 9 yrs ago:

This is Mt. Pangrango, a higher (almost 9900ft peak) but not as steep as Mt. Salak (7200ft peak). Lots of little valleys to search through. U'd be hard pressed to try and force land a jet and end up in 1 piece there. 

Flying to the south of Jakarta, is dangerous if only armed with a Jeppesen Map. No terrain depiction, only the MSA is there. I picked this from a Lido chart:

As you can see, Mt. Salak and Pangrango are just outside the MSA limit. Note MORA is 11900 and 10300. On the Jeppesen, this is not depicted on Halim Airport approach charts, nor on the STAR charts for HLP or CGK. 

A witness onboard an earlier flight told me that the previous flight was departing and arriving Halim 24. The pilots only had the approach and airport ground charts. Seeing the Nav Displays on the previous flight, it looks like they simply planned to depart, go along R206 airway (Radial 195° from Halim) until about 30NM and turn back. 

If they had reached 10000 feet as reported, they would have had to descend prior to reaching the 30NM mark. Sounds easy enough. BUT, late afternoon in that area is normally not good for flying. I've seen clouds "collapsing" down the side of Mt. Salak and spread across and cover the whole pass towards Pangrango before (I turned back... being in an unpressurized prop twin w/ no WXR). Quite often in the mid afternoon, clouds would cover both mountains, and only reveal Pangrango, and Salak is totally covered... looking like a big cumulus over small area undercast... (I used the term, "Cumulus Granitus" a lot after seeing that).

If these guys were only armed with Jeppesen approach, STAR, and enroute charts, a simple "fly out along airway R206 to 30NM and turn back", would be fine in VMC, but deadly in IMC and bad localized weather. A simple urge to duck under over there is hard to overcome unless you know the terrain there. The crew was unfamiliar with the area. Last time someone crashed into Mt. Salak, it was an air force C-212 on the way back to Halim from the south coast after some remote sensing equipment testing. Been there, also did the same, test remote sensing equipment down the south coast, heading back, huge temptation to simply press, "Direct to" Halim airport on GPS or FMC.

My crew used to hate me for forcing them to plot a course through the pass on the GPS and Mission console display, added with the instructions "In IMC Do not proceed direct HLM unless west of radial 200° HLM and within 20 nautical miles of HLM. Strict adherence to planned course through the pass in IMC, maintain 6000 above until 20 nautical miles from Halim. If GPS u/s or unable to maintain 6000, revert to alternative IMC return plan" (which involved a long detour west to avoid terrain over 1hr30 extra on that prop). It wasn't until they went through the pass in IMC did they appreciate the instructions. On a bad day, the pass collects northerly winds like a compressor on the north side, then spews it up the middle and down the sides in an erratic manner. I went through it in IMC once on one of those bad days, I'd rather not go through that again ever. Looking back at it now, even 6000 was probably too low.

The fact remains, the aircraft disappeared in a remote area albeit very near Jakarta. There has been numerous rumours on where the aircraft is and that it had been found. One, is relatively disgusting, saying that it was found in two pieces and bodies strewn around the place. Disgusting misinformation.

The area is quite remote. The areas above 3000ft are often covered by cloud in afternoon. And very few aircraft traffic go by there on a given month, let alone in a day! The military from nearby Atang Sanjaya Airbase also don't go down that way often either.

Let's hope tomorrow morning brings clear weather for the air search to continue and the aircraft be found quickly, survivors treated as soon as possible, and the dead be laid to rest.

It is not a good day at all!


UPDATE 1: 2012-05-08 0310UTC.
Wreckage found, spotted from the air. Ground SAR teams reported less than 1 kilometer from scene according to Detik.com article. Aircraft appears to be relatively intact but need ground teams to assess the extent of damage and seek out survivors inside. This report was made public by Deputy SAR Ops, Hadi L. SAR will try to evacuate survivors and the deceased by air if and when possible.


The report also contradicts previous rumors of aircraft found split in two and bodies strewn around the place! As I said before: Disgusting misinformation not welcomed anywhere!


UPDATE 2: 2012-05-08 0420UTC.
Pictures of the crash site found. Rest In Peace to All On Board RA-97004.

It is obvious that the aircraft hit a cliff and that survivability is slim if not impossible. Analysis will come later after I can come to terms with the pictures. Once again, RIP those on board. May God Give Strength To Those They Left Behind.


Article continues HERE.